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Abstract 20 
 21 
Background: Although human resources for health (HRH) represent a critical element for health 22 
systems, many countries still face acute HRH challenges. These challenges are compounded in 23 
conflict-affected settings where health needs are exacerbated and the health workforce is often 24 
decimated. A body of research has explored the issues of recruitment of health workers, but the 25 
literature is still scarce, in particular with reference to conflict-affected states. This study adds to that 26 
literature by exploring, from a central-level perspective, how the HRH recruitment policies changed in 27 
Timor-Leste (1999-2018), the drivers of change and their contribution to rebuilding an appropriate 28 
health workforce after conflict.  29 
Methods: This research adopts a retrospective, qualitative case study design based on 76 documents 30 
and 20 key informant interviews, covering a period of almost 20 years. Policy analysis, with elements 31 
of political economy analysis was conducted to explore the influence of actors and structural 32 
elements. 33 
Results: Our findings describe the main phases of HRH policy-making during the post-conflict period 34 
and explore how the main drivers of this trajectory shaped policy-making processes and outcomes. 35 
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While initially the influence of international actors was prominent, the number and relevance of 36 
national actors, and resulting influence, later increased as aid dependency diminished. However, this 37 
created a fragmented institutional landscape with diverging agendas and lack of inter-sectoral 38 
coordination, to the detriment of the long-term strategic development of the health workforce and 39 
the health sector. 40 
Conclusions: The study provides critical insights to improve understanding of HRH policy 41 
development and effective practices in a post-conflict setting but also looking at the longer term 42 
evolution. An issue that emerges across the HRH policy-making phases is the difficulty of reconciling 43 
the technocratic with the social, cultural and political concerns. Additionally, while this study 44 
illuminates processes and dynamics at central level, further research is needed from the decentralised 45 
perspective on aspects, such as deployment, motivation, career paths, which are under-regulated at 46 
central level.  47 
 48 
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 51 
Background 52 
 53 
Human resources for health (HRH) represent a critical element for the functioning of health systems. 54 
Poor availability and management of human resources have been recognized as key health system 55 
barriers and, despite the efforts, many low-income countries continue to face acute HRH challenges 56 
[1, 2]. These challenges are compounded in conflict-affected settings where health needs are 57 
exacerbated as a result of the conflict and the health workforce is often decimated by either death or 58 
flight due to violence [3, 4]. Consequently, the challenge of attracting and recruiting the right persons 59 
into the health workforce, according to needs, becomes more acute and relevant [5-7]. Some studies 60 
in low and middle-income countries (LMIC) have focused on Human Resource Management (HRM) [8-61 
14] and highlighted how recruitment affects retention in remote areas [15-19]. Research has also 62 
looked at the specific HRM challenges in fragile and conflict-affected countries [5-7, 20-27], with a 63 
focus on health worker retention and (financial and non-financial) incentives.  64 
 65 
This research adds to that literature by focusing in particular on the role that recruitment policies and 66 
practices play in rebuilding an appropriate health workforce after conflict and following the trajectory 67 
and patterns over the subsequent years. Our case study is Timor-Leste from the immediate post-68 
conflict period to 2018 (Box 1), which gives a retrospective view covering a period of almost 20 years. 69 
This paper focuses on policies and policy-making processes at central level related to health workforce 70 
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recruitment and presents a political economy analysis about how and why official and informal 71 
practices developed, including the drivers, challenges and blockages at different stages.  72 
 73 
Box 1: History and context of Timor-Leste 
 
The history of Timor-Leste has been one of struggle for self-determination. In 1975, after more than 
four centuries of colonial domination, Timor-Leste proclaimed its independence from Portugal.  This 
lasted only 9 days before Indonesia illegally occupied the country. A repressive government ruled for 
24 years (1975-1999) during which around 20% of the population died due to violence, starvation 
and disease [28]. The publication in September 1999 of the results of a UN-backed referendum to 
determine Timor’s status in favour of independence triggered a violent withdrawal of Indonesia which 
left around 1,400 people killed, more than 300,000 displaced and the governance structure and 
infrastructure including the health system virtually collapsed. In May 2002, the country finally restored 
its independence after a UN transitional government (United Nations Transitional Administration in 
East Timor - UNTAET) was put in place from 1999 to 2002 and had facilitated the process of 
development of a new independent Timorese government [29, 30].  
 
The UNTAET and World Bank-managed support to the transition was considered a successful 
development story [31]. Since independence, there have been four presidential elections (2002, 2007, 
2012 and 2017) and a succession of eight Constitutional Governments, and the country ranked 
highest the Democracy Index of the Economist Intelligence Unit in South East Asia in 2016 [32]. 
However, an outbreak of violence in 2006-2007, triggered by disputes within the Armed Forces 
between the leadership and the ex-FALANTIL soldiers (armed group fighting in the independence 
struggle, which had been absorbed into the Army) caused the displacement of 150,000 people and 
led to the resignation of the Prime Minister. This wave of instability revealed the tensions between 
leaders, the frustration among the younger population due to high unemployment, and other state-
threatening problems such as ethnic rivalry between the East and West of the country [33, 34]. The 
violent events impacted the health system, although most services remained available thanks to the 
Cuban Medical Brigade (CMB) which was perceived as a neutral health workforce and therefore not 
targeted [35]. However, the violence was reported to have had a negative impact on the perceived 
State legitimacy [36]. While no such level of violence has happened since, tensions still prevail and 
few people have perceived benefit from the positive development of macroeconomic indicators [37]. 
The country has actually greatly benefited from oil revenues since signing an agreement with 
Australia in March 2003 on the exploitation of the gas and oil fields in the Timor Sea [38]. However, 
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the economic benefits of this have not reached all layers of society equitably and in 2014 more than 
41% of the population was still reported to live below the poverty line [39]. In addition, loans from 
World Bank, ADB and other bilateral and multilateral institutions appear to be largely invested in 
‘megaprojects’ with limited impact on the overall economy. Cronyism and corruption are growing 
significantly [40] with limited local capacity and accountability being built over time in this regard 
and, as a result, the Corruption Perception Index increased from 28 in 2014 to 38 in 2017 [41]. 
Related to the violent events in 2006 and following a 14-fold increase in national budget from 
US$135M in 2006 to US$1,850M in 2013, mainly from oil-revenues [42], the civil service grew by 75% 
from 20,000 to 35,000 staff [43]. This was reported to have mitigated the risk of further violence [43] 
but the increase in government’s capacity has not been commensurate with staffing growth; 
furthermore, the workforce expansion is unsustainable in light of the decline in oil-revenues in more 
recent years (Figure 1) [42, 44, 45]. 
 
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
 
Elections in July 2017 resulted in a minority government which lasted only a few months before the 
President dissolved the Parliament in January 2018 and called for early elections which were held in 
May 2018. Today, Timor-Leste has a population of 1,167,242 with 70% under the age of 35, an equal 
gender distribution and an estimated annual growth rate of 1.81% [46, 47].  
 74 
Methods 75 
 76 
This study is part of a broader research covering HRH recruitment and deployment in Timor-Leste and 77 
exploring both the central and sub-national debates. In the present paper we focus exclusively on the 78 
central level perspective. The research adopts a retrospective, qualitative case study design [48], 79 
drawing from documentary review and key informant interviews. Policy analysis was conducted, with 80 
elements of political economy analysis which allowed the identification of how elements of the agency 81 
(actors, agendas, power relations) and structure (socio economic conditions, historical legacies, formal 82 
and informal institutions, cultural norms) contributed to drive the policy trajectory [49].  83 
 84 
Data collection 85 
 86 
A document search was carried out to identify published literature and documents relevant to HRH 87 
recruitment policies and regulatory frameworks in Timor-Leste between 1999 and 2017. Internet 88 
searches were carried out using Google, PubMed, HRH Journal and Government websites (e.g., Official 89 
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Gazette, Public Service Commission, UNTAET legislation archives). Additionally, key informants were 90 
asked to suggest relevant documentation and the contextual knowledge of the team in country also 91 
allowed retrieving further documents. In total, 76 documents were reviewed (a summary is provided in 92 
Additional File 1). 93 
 94 
Key informants were purposefully selected to include a wide range of actors involved in HRH policy-95 
making over the study period. Twenty key informants were interviewed (Table 1) by AAG and JM 96 
between March and May 2018, either face-to-face or remotely, and in Tetum, English, Spanish or 97 
Portuguese depending on the location and the language preference of the respondent. A standard 98 
topic guide was used flexibly to adapt to each respondent’s knowledge and elicit a retrospective 99 
enquiry about the main HRH challenges with a focus on recruitment, policy solutions to HRH issues, 100 
changes in policies and practices, drivers of change, actors, and agendas. (Additional File 2). 101 
 102 
Table 1: Summary of key informants by type and gender 103 
Type of KI TOTAL 
Gender 
M F 
Ministry of Health (MoH) 8 8 0 
National (governmental 
non-MoH) 
5 5 0 
International* 7 4 3 
Total 20 17 3 
Note: (*) international actors include both those who were still in Timor Leste at the time of the interviews as well 104 
as those who had been there some time during the study period but are now based elsewhere 105 
 106 
Data analysis 107 
 108 
Information was extracted from the documents using an Excel-based template including an analytical 109 
thematic framework developed for this purpose (Additional File 3). Based on this, an initial draft of a 110 
‘policy timeline’ was prepared which described in chronological order the key events and changes that 111 
had happened. The documentary analysis also helped to identify gaps in the information available, so 112 
that these could be addressed during the key informant interviews.  113 
 114 
Key informant interviews (KII) were recorded, transcribed and translated (where needed). Verbatim 115 
transcripts were manually analysed, using a series of pre-defined descriptive themes (Additional File 116 
3), but also focusing on emerging cross-cutting, analytical themes, more apt to capture the political 117 
economy issues and the dynamics which shaped the decision-making processes [50]. Data 118 
triangulation was carried out between different sources of data, comparing the narratives of different 119 
key informants, but also triangulating information from informants and documents. Based on the KIIs’ 120 
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analysis, the ‘policy timeline’ was revised, updated and enriched and key elements, themes and 121 
patterns were teased out and discussed among all authors before the final drafting of the article. 122 
 123 
Ethical approval was obtained from the Liverpool School of Tropical Medicine and from Timor-Leste 124 
National Health Institute. 125 
 126 
Results 127 
 128 
In this section, we present the main findings of our analysis following a chronological order to show 129 
how events unfolded overtime. We also highlight the key turning points and the main drivers and 130 
dynamics that shaped the policy-making processes. 131 
 132 
Immediate aftermath of Indonesia’s withdrawal and the transitional period (1999-2002) 133 
 134 
In September 1999, with the violent withdrawal of Indonesia, the health system, like much of the rest 135 
of the social, economic and organisational structure and the infrastructure of Timor-Leste, had been 136 
destroyed [51]. In terms of HRH, the damages were profound. Most of the 135 doctors working in 137 
Timor-Leste under the Indonesian government were non-Timorese and left; only about 26 doctors 138 
remained [28]. Other critical staffing issues included the shortage of midwives, technicians and health 139 
managers, and the rural-urban imbalances both of which were further exacerbated by the insecurity 140 
following the 1999 violence; and the excessive number of nurses inherited from the Indonesian system 141 
[52].  142 
 143 
Faith-based and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) were the first to be able to provide basic 144 
health services [51, 53] and, to do so, they brought in expatriate staff, but also recruited and paid local 145 
health personnel available in the districts [54]. Key informants reported that recruitment criteria were 146 
rather loose as it was not always possible to find formally qualified staff to fill the position and vacancy 147 
advertisement and recruitment were often based on word-of-mouth. 148 
 149 
“We did not do the recruitment per merit. We just indicated people. […] I called them to the 150 
health centre and proposed them to the expatriates of the NGOs. If they agree, we’d recruit 151 
them” (MoH KI). 152 
 153 
While much of the technical and financial support for the health sector (including HRH) was provided 154 
by external partners [55], the Timorese health leaders of the nascent Ministry of Health (MoH) were 155 
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keen to strengthen their role, increase the legitimacy of the state and the credibility of the emerging 156 
government through the so-called ‘timorisation’ process [28, 52]. In line with this state-building 157 
aspiration, it was important for them to build a health workforce that would distance itself from the 158 
Indonesian one, considered inefficient. Key informants recalled,  159 
 160 
“The administrators took the line that it wasn’t just matter of putting people back into the 161 
positions they were in and paying them, but it was creating the whole civil service. […] They 162 
were very much trying to get a sense of unity [through the civil service]” (international KI). 163 
 164 
This overhaul was to be achieved in three ways. Firstly, it was imperative to rationalise the number of 165 
health workers (nurses, in particular) employed in the public sector which was inflated for political and 166 
patronage reasons under the Indonesian occupation. Secondly, there was a desire to reduce or 167 
eliminate corruption, collusion and nepotism (often referred to using the Indonesian acronym, KKN) 168 
that was a key feature of the previous system and introduce a meritocratic approach. Finally, it was 169 
important to create a health workforce loyal to the new country, excluding those who had supported 170 
the pro-Indonesia militia during the independence struggle (KIIs). The aim was to ensure equitable 171 
access to quality service for the entire population of the newly formed state. 172 
 173 
“Our leaders wanted to build a public administration that was not a replica of the previous 174 
system. So, when we defined the regulations to form our public service, we did not look at the 175 
Indonesian model which was disproportionate. We started from zero” (national KI). 176 
 177 
These objectives laid the foundation of the first civil service recruitment which started in mid-2001 178 
(UNTAET Regulation 2000/03). The final estimate of the health staff needed was of 1,242 as agreed 179 
between UNTAET, MoH and the Civil Service and Public Employment Office (CISPE). Informants 180 
reported that this number, about 47% of the 2,632 in place during the occupation, was mainly 181 
dictated by the budget available, which was limited and dependant on international partners [56]. Fifty 182 
job descriptions were developed, vacancies opened, and recruitment of health staff began. In order to 183 
ensure staff retention in remote areas, vacancies were initially tied to specific locations rather than a 184 
central pool from which new recruits would subsequently be deployed (an approach which was later 185 
adopted). According to one key informant, in line with the aims of the recruitment, selection criteria 186 
included professional training, place of birth and perceived loyalty to the new state, against the 187 
Indonesian regime. 188 
 189 
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“The first criteria was that the person had to be trained as a nurse or healthcare professional. 190 
The second, we had to look for people that were from that district to facilitate them going there 191 
[…]. Then the third criteria that we considered was that it had to be people that in 1999 didn’t 192 
run away to Indonesia. These people are a priority” (MoH KI). 193 
 194 
However, a number of issues hampered the recruitment process. The shortage of doctors remained a 195 
challenge and terms and conditions provided by NGOs were much more favourable so that many 196 
stayed in that sector.  Additionally, strikes and protests broke out due to accusations of favouritism 197 
and mismanagement. One informant recalled,   198 
 199 
“The Bishop came down to calm the situation at the hospital and to listen to the demands of 200 
the demonstrators. They were saying that those who had fought for independence had not 201 
passed the recruitment. So, I went with [xxx] and we modified the recruitment. Those who had 202 
stayed would have work first, and those who went to Indonesia, they have to work last” (MoH 203 
KI). 204 
 205 
In 2001, 724 workers were recruited (Table 2). The remaining vacancies were filled by international 206 
staff recruited by NGOs or by the MoH with Australian Government’s funds.  207 
 208 
Table 2: Public workforce situation (October 2001) 209 
 
Establishment Filled Vacant Vac. Rate (%) 
National Level     
National DHS 49 22 27 55 
NCHET 32 23 9 28 
Central Lab. 22 15 7 32 
National Hosp. 251 9 242 96 
Districts     
Aileu 46 36 10 22 
Ainaro 42 34 8 19 
Baucau 152 135 17 11 
Bobonaro 85 69 16 19 
Covalima 58 46 12 21 
Dili (District) 123 50 73 59 
Ermera 54 38 16 30 
Lautem 60 42 18 30 
Liquica 39 38 1 3 
Manatuto 48 40 8 17 
Manufahi 57 44 13 23 
Oecusse 57 29 28 49 
Viqueque 67 54 13 19 
TOTAL 1242 724 518 42 
  Source: Civil Service and Public Employment Office (CISPE) 2001 210 
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  Note: DHS: Division of Health Services; NCHET: National Centre for Health Education and Training 211 
 212 
Recruitment was reported to be slow and haphazard leading to poor morale and loss of trust in the 213 
administration by those involved in the process [28]. Their analysis lucidly highlights the trade-off 214 
between incompatible ‘technical’ and ‘political’ objectives (Table 3) [28]. However, despite the salience 215 
of the HRH challenges identified then, the immediate health sector reconstruction in Timor-Leste and 216 
the model of post-conflict health system rehabilitation has generally been judged a success [31, 52]. 217 
 218 
Table 3: Competing goals for the recruitment of civil servants for the health sector 219 
Goal Competing goal 
 Produce measurable results quickly  Achieve transition to full East Timorese 
management 
 Disburse funds quickly  Ensure national decision making and full 
ownership 
 Focus on building capacity 
 Ensure sustainability 
 Ensure a coherent sector-wide approach  Accommodate individual donor needs 
 Provide services to all now  Improve scope and quality of services 
 Develop health policies soon, before it is ‘too late’  Consult widely on all policy issues 
 Start flexible to avoid setting directions too early 
Source: [28] 220 
 221 
 222 
A “game changer”: the involvement of the Cuban Medical Brigade (2003-2005) 223 
 224 
The idea of requesting Cuban support to address staff shortages had been discussed since 2001 [57]. 225 
In February 2003, this option was adopted at top political level when an agreement was brokered 226 
between the then President Xanana Gusmao, José Ramos Horta (Minister of Foreign Affairs) and Fidel 227 
Castro for the provision of Cuban doctors as well as the training of Timorese students. The Cuban 228 
involvement was described by one key informant as “a game changer” for the health sector. In 229 
December 2004, the engagement was further detailed as the training of 1,000 doctors (calculated as 230 
roughly 1 doctor per 1,000 population) at the Latin American Medical School (LAMS) in Cuba
1
 and the 231 
deployment of 300 Cuban doctors to provide medical care across the country as well as to supervise 232 
and further train the medical students and new doctors [57].  233 
 234 
The use of subsidised training effectively shifted the focus from post-graduation recruitment 235 
procedures to pre-service education scholarship awards, as those trained in Cuba were expected to 236 
return to serve in Timor-Leste and were automatically absorbed in the public health sector
2
. While in 237 
recent years, the absorption of medical graduates into public service is becoming problematic (see 238 
below), at the time, it was clear that scholarship assignment became a synonym of hiring. 239 
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 240 
“Instead of recruiting, the MoH is appointing through training” (national KI). 241 
 242 
The selection of students to access Cuban medical training was undertaken initially by the MoH, based 243 
on academic results in secondary school, a written exam, an interview and a physical examination 244 
(KIIs). Gender balance was also sought in the selection, and quotas were introduced based on the 245 
geographical origin of the candidates
3
, with the intention that they would be deployed in their 246 
districts of origin ensuring an appropriate coverage across districts, increasing retention and health 247 
worker acceptability for local communities. Although the geographical criterion initially created 248 
difficulties due to the low skills of those coming from remote areas, these were overcome in 249 
subsequent years.  250 
 251 
By mid-2018, the Cuban-supported programme had graduated 934 Timorese medical doctors (KII). 252 
Based on the MoH database, this rapid scale-up of the medical workforce has increased the density of 253 
doctors per population from 0.03 to 0.71 per 1,000 in 2000 and 2017 respectively, among the highest 254 
in South-East Asia (Figure 2). In 2017, the gender distribution of the medical workforce was almost 255 
equal with a male to female (M:F) ratio of 1.01 although the balance was in favour of males at 256 
specialist level (M:F ratio of 2.6). 257 
 258 
[Insert Figure 2 about here] 259 
 260 
Relapse into violence, stabilisation and expansion period (2006-2012) 261 
 262 
The relapse into violence in 2006 and the tense political environment affected the state’s legitimacy 263 
[58] and led to a degradation of accountability and transparency with increased perception of 264 
corruption and nepotism [41]. This probably influenced recruitment practices for the health workforce. 265 
For example, it is possible that the settlement of the dispute between government and ex-FALANTIL 266 
soldiers led to the provision of privileges for the families of veterans of the armed struggle. These 267 
privileges included the possibility of obtaining scholarships for higher education bypassing the entry 268 
requirements and examinations (Decree Law 8/2009), which opened the system to opportunities for 269 
discretion and patronage.  270 
 271 
From 2011, the responsibility for selecting students into higher education for all health professions 272 
was moved to the Ministry of Education (MoEd) (KII). Key informants highlighted the alarming absence 273 
of functioning mechanisms for inter-sectoral coordination, which not only left room for discretion and 274 
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abuse in decision-making, but also had important consequences for the development of the health 275 
workforce. Indeed, the fact that decisions about access to training were moved outside the MoH and 276 
some groups were exempted from the standard selection procedures had (and continues to have) 277 
critical consequences in terms of quality as well as of numbers and profiles of the future health 278 
workforce and may determine a mismatch between intake and needs which the MoH has been left to 279 
deal with. 280 
 281 
“The MoH is not involved in any decisions on the number of students. […] There are no 282 
mechanisms for coordination between the MoH and the MoEd. This is a little bit very sad. […] If 283 
we recruit too much it will be a disaster for our country” (MoH KI). 284 
 285 
The tensions between different national institutions also reveal that, from the aftermath of the 286 
independence, the decision-making arena has become more crowded. As a consequence, a number of 287 
emerging competing agendas and interests made coordination and alignment more difficult. New 288 
actors involved in HRH recruitment and deployment practices included not only the MoH, the MoEd, 289 
National University of Timor-Leste (Universidade Nacional Timor Lorosa’e - UNTL, but also the Ministry 290 
of Finance, the Public Service Commission (PSC), the Human Capital Development Fund (HCDF) and, 291 
more recently with the attempt to decentralise the deployment process, the Directors of 292 
Municipalities.  293 
 294 
As the number of actors involved in HRH decision-making increased, so did the official legislation 295 
applicable to the civil service in general and to health workers specifically (Table 4). Importantly, key 296 
informants stressed that these regulations were often overlooked or weakly implemented. Indeed, in 297 
the increasingly fragmented and instable political environment with constant changes in governments, 298 
policies were often blocked at approval or implementation stage. In other cases, funds are lacking to 299 
support implementation. 300 
 301 
“The implementation of the policies is not consistent. One government comes in with their own 302 
policy, then suddenly there’s another government with a different policy and that cause the 303 
inconsistencies” (MoH KI).  304 
 305 
Table 4: Key official laws and regulations on HRH recruitment  306 
Law, Decree law, Directive Content 
Implementation / 
Comments 
Directive 3/2000 (UNTAET) 
Establishing Civil Service and Public 
Employment Office (CISPE) 
Directive 4/2000 later 
defining the terms of the 
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Civil Service 
East Timor Health Policy 
Framework (June 2002) 
Includes one chapter for Human Resources 
for Health (first HRH policy) 
Still considered the overall 
policy framework for the 
sector in 2018 
Decree Law 5/2003 Organic Statute of the Ministry of Health 
Establishment of 
Department of Human 
Resources 
Law 8/2004 Statute of the Civil Service 
Not fully implemented due 
to lack of resources (KII) 
Decree law 14/2004 
Health professional practice including the 
registration for health professionals 
In the absence of health 
professional councils 
registration of professionals 
is done at MoH 
National Health Workforce 
Plan 2005-2015 (draft) 
Health workforce situation analysis and 
strategic plan 
Prepared but not 
approved/implemented 
Government Resolution 
6/2006  
Policy on Decentralisation and Local 
Government. Established the basis for 
decentralisation to the Municipal level 
Supported by 10/2006 
establishing the Secretariat 
for Decentralisation 
Revised National Health 
Workforce Plan 2007-2015 
(draft) 
Revision of previous National HRH Plan 
2005-2011 including workforce projections 
Prepared but not 
approved/implemented 
Decree Law 30/2008  Regulation of scholarships to study abroad 
As a key element of the plan 
for human capital 
development 
Decree Law 34/2008 
Regulations for recruitment and selection of 
civil servants (also promotion) 
Further developed with DL 
12/2009 (see below)  
Decree Law 5/2009 Amending 8/2004 on terms for recruitment 
 The aim is strengthening 
accountability in recruitment 
Decree Law 7/2009 Establishing Public Service Commission  
Decree Law 8/2009 Award of scholarships to children of veterans  
Decree Law 12/2009  
Defines the rule for awarding scholarships for 
higher education and specialisation (terms of 
bonding agreements) 
Ratified later by Decree 
38/2012  
Decree Law 36/2009 Legal regime for access to higher education  
Decree Law 16/2010  
Statute of the Timor-Leste National 
University 
 
Decree Law 22/2011  
Amendment to DL 34/2008 re. recruitment, 
selection and promotion of civil servants 
More specific regulations 
about processes and criteria 
for recruitment, selection 
and promotion 
Timor-Leste Strategic 
Development Plan 2011-2030 
Including HRH recruitment policy directions 
and minimum staffing norms 
Approved and being 
implemented 
National Health Sector 
Strategic Plan 2011-2030 
Includes projections of HRH needs up to 
2030 
In the absence of an 
approved HRH Plan these 
are the figures used 
Human Resources 
Management Manual (PSC) 
Detailed procedures including one chapter 
for recruitment and selection 
Approved and being 
implemented 
Orientation 9/2016  Simplified recruitment of 400 health workers  
Executive order waiving 400 
newly graduated HWs 
supported by Government 
from technical tests 
Ministerial Diploma 51/2017 
“Saúde na Familia” (Family 
Health) 
Establishing the principles and procedures 
for the introduction of this family-based PHC 
model 
This programme was a 
Prime Minister’s initiative 
National Health Workforce 
Plan 2018-2022 
Projections updated from NHSSP 2011-2030 
Drafted and waiting for 
government approval 
MoH Dispatch 07/2018  Internships Regime (“Internato”) for newly Terms of the agreement to 
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graduated health workers beneficiaries of 
scholarships.  
recruit 320 unemployed 
health workers as interns 
Ministerial Dispatch 05/2018  
Establishment of Liaison with Cuban (and 
Chinese) Medical Brigades  
To facilitate communication 
and coordination 
MoH/C(and CH)MBs 
 307 
 308 
The increasing number of actors involved in HRH processes, their conflicting agendas, the absence or 309 
non-respect of formal regulations and the weak management systems all contribute to the weakening 310 
of formal institutions and the emergence of informal practices. Over time, the recruitment process 311 
appears to be reverting to the previous practices of patronage and discretion and past hierarchies. 312 
This was noted by the key informants. 313 
 314 
“In relation to recruitment for the MoH, we undergo procedures that are not necessarily based 315 
upon the principles of meritocracy. […] We observe the issue of corruption, collusion and 316 
nepotism, the family approach. Why this is happening? Because, apart from being a post-317 
conflict country, there are also demands for livelihoods. At the same time, we have significant 318 
gaps in regulations and procedures that define the recruitment process and therefore it was still 319 
dominated by a situation called “calling each other” (politika bolu malu).” (national KI). 320 
 321 
HRH reforms under fiscal constraints (2013-2018) 322 
 323 
The HRH challenges highlighted above have been made starker by the fiscal constraints, which 324 
increased in 2012 when oil revenues dwindled and in 2015 when the reserves in the Petroleum Fund 325 
begun to diminish [44, 45]. Yet a World Bank study [59] reported that the health wage bill increased 326 
by 344% between 2008 and 2014, mainly due to the absorption of the newly graduated doctors into 327 
the public sector (Table 5), despite the fact that doctors’ salaries are not substantially higher than 328 
those of other health professionals [60].  329 
 330 
Table 5: Number of staff by cadre in the public health workforce  331 
Grades/cadres 
 
2005 2010 2015 2016 2017 
General Grades  356 615 1289 1270 1225 
Special Grades  
Medical Specialist  0 9 23 23 29 
Medical Doctors  40 75 820 835 891 
Midwife  274 388 533 586 619 
Nurse  820 883 1139 1205 1272 
Assistant Nurse  N/A N/A 237 234 232 
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Allied Health Professionals  100 316 440 512 630 
Total special grades  1234 1671 3192 3395 3673 
Total all grades  1590 2286 4481 4665 4898 
 332 
Source: MoH HRH Database 2017 333 
 334 
In this context, the absorption into the public sector of the growing number of health workers became 335 
a pressing problem. Although estimates vary (from 200 to 600), a high proportion of the pool of 336 
qualified doctors and other professionals is currently unemployed, due to lack of funds from the 337 
Ministry of Finance to recruit them into the civil service. Worryingly, pressure will be mounting over 338 
the next few years as the sustained production of health workers will continue and even increased, 339 
based on politically-pressured student intake. Indeed, beyond the privileges accorded to veterans’ 340 
families described above, the introduction in 2016 of a ‘special regime’ to access higher education, 341 
following a simpler selection process without technical tests, for families of military and police officers, 342 
diplomats, members of Parliament, journalists, elite athletes and students from international 343 
secondary schools [61] contributed to this problem. While in principle only 10% of the annual intake 344 
should be recruited through this modality, key informants noted that the system is abused because of 345 
the (politically-pressured) acceptance of a high number of students through the special regime. For 346 
instance, in 2018 more than 65% of students enrolled in Nursing studies, 60% of those in Midwifery 347 
and 35% in Medicine went through the “special regime” (Table 6). While the Cuban Medical Brigade 348 
(CMB) deliberately kept out of the politics and simply scaled up their training capacity, the choice, as 349 
one respondent explained, has obvious long-term consequences for the quality and distribution of the 350 
workforce,  351 
 352 
“We need to fix the special regime because the veterans’ children have low marks, but they all 353 
choose Medicine. […] If they don't have a good understanding [of Medicine] then they might 354 
give the wrong medication or make mistakes, and this is a problem” (national KI). 355 
 356 
Table 6: Student intake in the Faculty of Medicine and Health Sciences of UNTL (2004-2018) 357 
Department 
New students 
2004 2005 
(*) 
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
(**) 
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
(***) 
2018  
(***) 
General 
Medicine 
26 510 47 15 20 30 -- 42 58 38 36 36 35 52 (12) 107(40) 
Nursing     190 70 -- 88 69 83 64 20 73 95 (34) 197 (130) 
Midwifery     38 99 -- 75 68 84 68 22 76 92 (35) 159 (96) 
Pharmacy       --    35 25 70 63 135 
Nutrition       --     20 64 59 103 
Biomedical/ 
Lab. 
      --       45 120 
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Total 26 510 47 15 248 199 -- 205 195 205 203 123 318 406 821 
Source:  UNTL Registry 358 
Note:  (*) 2005: first mass enrolment for medical education by CMB  359 
(**) 2010: no enrolment of students due to disputes between MoEd and UNTL about UNTL’s 360 
accountability in the selection process. 361 
(***) 2017 and 2018: Numbers in parenthesis indicate the intake of new students under the Special 362 
Regime, clearly surpassing the statutory 10% of the intake (no data available for 2016 or other cadres). 363 
 364 
As an interim measure to address the absorption issue, a dispatch from the Minister of Health 365 
(07/2018/I/MS) was issued in January 2018 to recruit 320 recently graduated health workers as interns 366 
(‘regimen de internato’) with a standard stipend regardless of professional level of $200 (in rural areas) 367 
and $150 (in urban locations) for a period of six months to be extended if the need persists and the 368 
performance of the intern is satisfactory. However, as KIs said, the success of this programme in 369 
reducing the tensions is yet to be seen, and there is a widespread perception that the government has 370 
been and continues to waste money on the training of medical doctors rather than using data and 371 
evidence on the real needs.  372 
 373 
The contrast of the current situation with the immediate post-conflict phase could not be starker. As 374 
one respondent put it,  375 
 376 
“At that time, we didn’t have the people, but the money was there. Now it is probable that we 377 
have too many people but not the money” (MoH KI). 378 
 379 
Discussion 380 
 381 
Our analysis has some limitations. First, the long period of time covered, spanning over almost 20 382 
years, created challenges during data collection, both in terms of locating and accessing documents 383 
that may have been lost, as well as contacting key informants, in particular international actors who 384 
have left Timor-Leste. Data were also difficult to retrieve due to the weak information systems. 385 
Additionally, many interviewees struggled with recall bias. However, the fact that respondents were 386 
open about it and distinguished between clear and only vague memories helped us make sense of 387 
their accounts. In a sense, even the mental selection between remembered/forgotten could be 388 
interpreted as an indicator of the key, most debated and contested areas of decision-making. In line 389 
with this, in order to elicit views on issues clearly remembered and to reduce recall bias, the topic 390 
guide we developed focused on the most relevant changes or challenges which respondents were 391 
asked to reflect on. We also carefully applied triangulation between different key informants as well as 392 
with documents and data to ensure the accuracy of the information and the relevance of the analysis.  393 
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 394 
Throughout the analysis, we have been explicitly reflective on our positionality with respect to the 395 
study subject [62]. Some authors (AAG, JM and SP) are ‘insiders’ to HRH policy-making in Timor-Leste 396 
and, although in different roles, have been directly involved in the policy changes described. This has 397 
advantages in terms of accessing information and actors as well as bringing participant-observations 398 
to the analysis, but it may reduce objectivity [63]. The presence of ‘outsiders’ among the authors 399 
allowed some distance from the study subject, while at the same time data interpretation could be 400 
collectively and iteratively reviewed. 401 
 402 
The study findings provide critical insights to enhance our understanding of HRH policy development 403 
from a policy and political economy perspective, in a post-conflict setting, but also following the 404 
developments over the longer period. The analysis allows the identification of the main phases of the 405 
policy trajectory during which different drivers played a significant role in shaping policy outcomes. In 406 
terms of actors, there was a shift over time as the relevance of external players faded in favour of that 407 
of internal actors and institutions. As in other settings during the immediate post-conflict phase [3, 408 
64-66], Western donors and multilateral organisations were essential and influential in the aftermath 409 
of the violence to provide financial and technical support to the nascent Republic, including 410 
supporting HRH systems. Later, Cuba became a prominent player and, despite their professed 411 
disengagement from ‘politics’, their views and approaches (e.g., gender and geographical balance of 412 
students selected) undoubtedly influenced policy-making. More recently, the trajectory in Timor-Leste 413 
took a different direction to many post-conflict countries, as national actors have emerged to play a 414 
more prominent role and their number and influence have increased in an increasingly fragmented 415 
political landscape [67]. It is important to note that the shift in actors’ roles is closely related to and 416 
driven by structural changes (specific to Timor-Leste’s economic history) and in particular the move 417 
from aid dependency in the first phases of the reconstruction, to financial independence due to oil 418 
revenues and, more recently, budget constraints related to the diminishing revenues. Over time, the 419 
structural features remained informed by the formal and informal institutions (i.e., the rules and 420 
norms) which are prevalent in the country and underlie the overall political and economic context. 421 
 422 
Agency and structure elements and their interplay influenced the policy processes and outcomes. 423 
Initially, the focus was on health workforce recruitment as is often the case [27], which was seen as 424 
fundamental not only for its contribution to the health sector but also in relation to the state-building 425 
efforts [6]. As in other settings [68], a key emerging issue was the challenge of achieving a balance 426 
between the ’what’ (technical) with the ‘how’ (political) [67] and reconciliation of a technocratic 427 
recruitment process based on rules and merit with political, cultural, relational norms and practices.  428 
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 429 
It appears that the recruitment system created in the aftermath of independence did consider both 430 
technical and political aspects and, perhaps because of this, was generally effective and survived over 431 
time. The relative success of this first round of HRH reforms could also be linked to specific individuals, 432 
their skills and leadership, both among external and national actors. Local elites were quick to 433 
organise themselves with enthusiasm and focus [28], also because of their state-building aspiration 434 
through HRH recruitment [6] and there was a substantial alignment in their agendas with that of the 435 
technical assistants, as also noted by others [55]. For example, the need felt by national decision-436 
makers to distance themselves from Indonesian rule and ‘KKN’ was in line with the technical and 437 
meritocratic approach of external advisers. Additionally, the fact that initially there were few actors in 438 
the decision-making arena limited the presence of competing agendas and disagreements. However, 439 
while this led to the re-establishment of a HRH recruitment system, the fact that the focus of our 440 
analysis rests predominantly on recruitment processes and doctors (rather than on other HR 441 
management issues or on other health professionals) highlights how these elements were priorities 442 
for policy makers at central level, while other cadres and issues (such as, deployment) remained 443 
under-regulated and dealt with at decentralised level, with the lack of overall strategy and clear official 444 
policies to enact, as documented also elsewhere [11, 12, 69]. Additionally, policy-makers paid little or 445 
no attention to health workers’ job preferences [60, 70] and decision-making remained a top-down 446 
exercise.  447 
 448 
Later, while the technical foundations of the recruitment system remained in place and were actually 449 
strengthened by institutions such as the PSC, the shift to ‘appointment through training’, due to the 450 
Cuban-supported training and virtually automatic absorption of newly graduated staff, meant a shift 451 
of power from the MoH to new actors (such as, MoEd and UNTL) with diverging interests not related 452 
to the long-term needs of the health sector, and increased the possibility of rule-bypassing, discretion 453 
and patronage.   454 
 455 
The tension between competing agendas may have been initially reduced or resolved thanks to the 456 
fiscal expansion and to the presence of the CMB and their ‘substitution’ role [71, 72]. However, with 457 
decreasing oil revenues, the CMB potentially phasing-out and increased political fragmentation, the 458 
competing interests are more difficult to reconcile and the tensions appears starker and riskier in the 459 
long term, leading to a low-quality workforce, inappropriate skill-mix, geographic maldistribution and 460 
financial unsustainability [73]. In the future, it will be essential that policy processes in Timor-Leste lead 461 
to more robust, sustainable and better implemented strategies on HRH training and recruitment. 462 
 463 
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Conclusions 464 
 465 
Our research aimed to provide a long retrospective account of the development of the systems to 466 
recruit health workers in post-conflict Timor-Leste. In this study, we explored the policies in place at 467 
central level, the main phases and key drivers of their evolution. Our findings point to patterns and 468 
elements both of the agency and structure in shaping the policy-making processes and outcomes.  469 
 470 
While the influence of international actors was a prominent feature of the initial phase after the 471 
conflict, in Timor-Leste there was an important change as national actors increased in numbers and 472 
relevance later on. This shift led to a fragmented institutional landscape with diverging agendas and 473 
lack of inter-sectoral coordination, to the detriment of the long-term strategic development of the 474 
health workforce and the health sector. Furthermore, a key issue that cuts across all phases is the 475 
difficulty in reconciling the technocratic elements of the reforms with the social, cultural and political 476 
aspects. Finally, the research component discussed here looks exclusively at processes and dynamics 477 
at central level, and finds that they have focused on regulating HRH recruitment and production, 478 
which are the most visible aspects for those operating centrally. Further research on issues, such as 479 
deployment and transfer, motivation, promotions and career paths (unregulated areas at central level) 480 
as well as on how implementation practices differ, modify or bypass central regulations, from the 481 
perspective of decentralised actors will be important to shed further light on the topic and 482 
complement the central level perspective.  483 
 484 
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 534 
Endnotes 535 
1
 In 2005 following the hurricane that affected Cuba, some of the medical training was moved to Dili 536 
where a Faculty of Medicine was established within the National University of Timor-Leste (UNTL), with 537 
Cuban teachers. Currently, students complete their training fully in Timor-Leste and nine Timorese 538 
doctors are being trained as faculty for pre-service education (KII). 539 
2 
While newly graduated doctors are fast-tracked into the public workforce, nurses and midwifes have 540 
to sit an exam for the recruitment into the civil service, under the oversight of the Public Service 541 
Commission with a full set of mechanisms to ensure meritocracy and fairness (Human Resources 542 
Management Manual, PSC 2014). 543 
3
 It is interesting to note that district-based quotas apply to medical students and not to other health 544 
sciences careers (e.g., nursing or midwifery). 545 
 546 
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Figure 1: Oil and Gas Revenues in Timor-Leste (2009-2015) (US$ million).  729 
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Figure 2: Density of doctors per 1,000 population in the South-East Asia Region.  734 
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